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Abstract 
Brexit creates an opportunity for alternative European financial centres. However, no 
comprehensive empirical analysis of the strategic positioning of actors within these financial 
centres has been conducted. In this article we outline findings from an extensive research 
project which we conducted in Frankfurt and Paris, two of the main ‘rivals’ to the City of 
London, in the aftermath of Brexit. We outline the core findings from this project and argue that 
the emerging competition between Frankfurt and Paris is shaped through four related axes: 
diversity, path dependency, territory and regulatory stability. Our analysis has implications for 
two bodies of literature within EU studies. First, inter-governmentalist and supra-nationalist 
approaches would benefit from interrogating more closely the contested sub-national politics of 
financial centres. Second, our analysis adds to a growing body of literature on European 
disintegration by interrogating the interaction of fragmentary and integrative dynamics in the 
sphere of European finance.   
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Brexit is likely to result in financial firms domiciled in the UK losing their passporting rights. 
As a result, significant business functions are likely to leave the City of London and relocate to 
inside the Eurozone. This has created the conditions for a ‘battle’ between European member 
states and financial centres in the aftermath of the Brexit vote (Howarth and Quaglia 2018). 
Despite these shifts, no comprehensive analysis of the strategic positioning of actors within 
alternative European financial centres has been conducted. This empirical deficit is compounded 
by a deeper theoretical challenge. Integration theorists have tended to analyse the evolution of 
European finance from either a supra-national or inter-governmental perspective. As a result, 
financial centres have been neglected analytically in the EU studies literature. Furthermore, this 
literature tends to assume that integration takes place against a background of growing 
economic interdependence which limits its capacity to account for emerging patterns of 
disintegration within the EU (Vollaard, 2014; Zielonka, 2014).  
 
This article seeks to overcome these blind spots by asking how actors within European financial 
centres have responded to the Brexit vote. The article draws on an extensive research project 
which we conducted in Frankfurt and Paris, the two leading ‘rivals’ to the City of London after 
Brexit, between November 2017 and March 2018. From our case studies, we highlight four key 
observations, which together emphasise the importance of diversity, path dependency, territory 
and regulatory stability in shaping the emerging competition between financial centres after 
Brexit.  
 
Our empirical analysis has important theoretical implications for the EU studies literature. First, 
we argue that conventional supra-nationalist and inter-governmentalist approaches within EU 
studies cannot capture the peculiar character of financial centres, which embody distinctive 
spaces within which local, national and global forces interact. In order to better account for the 
emerging competition between European financial centres after Brexit, we argue that theorists 
of European integration should draw upon a rich vein of scholarship within economic 
geography which has interrogated relations between global financial centres. Second, we argue 
that a focus on financial centres can shed new light on emerging processes of European 
disintegration. Brexit is likely to generate a geographical fragmentation of European financial 
markets. But it also creates new pressures for integration and supervisory convergence. A 
financial centres perspective can illuminate how this dynamic process of fragmentation and 
integration is shaped by actors operating at the sub-national level.    
 
The article proceeds as follows. In the first section, we argue that conventional approaches in 
EU studies have neglected financial centres which in turn limits their ability to analyse the 
emerging competition between European financial centres after Brexit. In the second section, 
we introduce our two empirical case studies - Frankfurt and Paris after the vote for Brexit - and 
outline the methodology which underpins our research. In the third section, we outline four key 
observations which together highlight the importance of diversity, path dependency, territory 
and regulatory stability in shaping the emerging competition between European financial 
centres. In the fourth section, we argue that our empirical analysis has broader theoretical 
implications for the EU studies literature. The final section concludes.  
 
Theorising European financial centres in a context of 
fragmentation   
The EU studies literature is limited in its capacity to explain the emerging competition between 
European financial centres after Brexit. As Quaglia and Howarth (2018) have noted, the EU 
studies literature deploys two broad lenses through which to understand the future of European 
finance. The first is supra-nationalist in orientation (Farrell & Newman, 2015; Mügge, 2010; 
Van Apeldoorn, 2002). Supra-nationalist approaches analyse how transnational actors, such as 
global firms and European financial lobby groups, organise at the European level and mobilise 
to shape EU financial policy and regulations in line with their own interests. This scholarship 
has been complemented by work which looks at how powerful EU institutions, for example the 
European Central Bank (ECB), seek to secure their policy goals, such as macroeconomic 
stability, by extending and thereby ‘governing’ through financial markets (Braun, 2018; Braun 
and Hubner, 2016). From this first perspective, we should see the formation of transnational 
coalitions in the aftermath of Brexit which seek to minimise the disruptive impact on business 
interests (Quaglia and Howarth, 2018).   
 
A second perspective, derivative of inter-governmental approaches, focuses on the ways in 
which the preferences of member states are shaped by national ‘varieties’ of financial capitalism 
(Deeg, 2010). For example, inter-governmentalists explain divergent member state preferences 
on Capital Markets Union and Banking Union by pointing to whether national financial systems 
display a ‘bank-based’ or ‘market-based’ structure (Quaglia et al., 2016). This perspective - 
which is ultimately the one that is adopted by Quaglia and Howarth (2018) - expects to see a 
‘neo-mercantilist’ race emerging between member states after Brexit as they compete to induce 
financial activity into their own territories. 
 
Whilst these approaches capture important aspects of the ‘battle’ over European finance after 
Brexit, there is a risk that they omit important aspects of the emerging competition between 
European financial centres. Supra-national approaches render financial centres invisible by 
privileging analytically the transnational policy-making process. Inter-governmental approaches 
view financial centres as derivative of particular national ‘varieties of capitalism’. Neither of 
these approaches can adequately capture the peculiar character of financial centres, which 
embody distinctive sub-national sites where global, national and local dynamics interact in 
complex ways.  
 
Financial centres embody crucial ‘nodes’ in transnational networks of global finance, through 
which global capital flows travel and come to be organised (Wójcik, 2013; Hall 2017). They 
host a variety of financial actors - from global banks to domestically oriented creditor 
institutions - as well as ancillary service providers, regulators and political actors (Sassen 2011). 
This gives financial centres a distinct character. They are ‘internationalised’ entities that are 
nonetheless embedded in distinct local and national contexts (Macartney, 2010). This means 
that financial centres are sui generis sites within European capitalism. As such, financial centres 
should be studied empirically in their own right, as distinctive spaces with their own peculiar 
dynamics and characteristics. Our empirical material on Frankfurt and Paris builds upon this 
insight and advances a new lens for theorising the ‘battle’ for European finance after Brexit.  
 
There is a second lacuna in the EU studies literature which limits its ability to explain emerging 
patterns of competition between European financial centres. As Rosamond (2016: 865-6) 
argues, both inter-governmentalist and supra-nationalist approaches assume that integration 
occurs against a series of ‘prior background conditions’ (ibid). In particular, growing ‘economic 
interdependence’ and increasing ‘transnational exchange’ are viewed as underlying drivers of 
regulatory convergence at the EU level (Moravscik, 1993; Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997).  
 
Brexit is likely to fundamentally disrupt this logic (Lavery et al., 2018). It embodies a moment 
of potential ‘regulatory decoupling’ between the UK and the EU which in turn will produce new 
barriers to trade between the two blocsi. This is particularly the case in the sphere of finance. 
Brexit is likely to generate a dynamic of financial market fragmentation for three principal 
reasons. First, it is likely to generate new barriers to entry for UK banks and financial 
institutions seeking access to the Single Market. Second, and relatedly, this means that there are 
political pressures to re-locate business activities to within the Single Market. This is likely to 
generate a geographical dispersal of financial activities between rival European financial 
centres. Third, it creates new regulatory challenges, particularly in relation to the supervision of 
financial activities. The dispersion of financial activities throughout different EU member states 
distributes supervisory responsibility between different national competent authorities (NCAs), 
creating the threat of supervisory divergence and regulatory arbitrage.  
 
The potential financial market fragmentation unleashed by Brexit is likely to impose costs on 
numerous actors. For example, the dispersal of business activities will force firms to duplicate 
resources and is likely to lead to increased transaction costs. However, some actors are well-
placed to benefit from this process of fragmentation. Our case studies of Frankfurt and Paris 
examine how some actors within European financial centres have positioned themselves in 
order to ‘capitalise’ on the Brexit process.  
 
Methodology 
Frankfurt and Paris were selected as case studies of alternative European financial centres after 
Brexit for a number of reasons.ii Historically, both Frankfurt and Paris have been located in the 
‘second tier’ of IFCs after the dominant global triad of New York, London and Tokyo (Cassis, 
2006) and both are currently both ranked as ‘Global Leaders’ with ‘broad and deep’ financial 
centre portfolios by The Global Financial Centres Index (Z/Yen and CDI 2018: 13). In the 
decade since the financial crisis, Frankfurt and Paris have retained their position amongst the 
world’s top eight financial centres, placing them as European financial hubs second only to the 
City (Cassis, 2018: 1). Frankfurt has been ranked as the EU’s second most competitive financial 
centre whilst its financial and related services sector employs 130,000 workers (Schamp, 
2018). Paris plays host to the largest financial workforce in the eurozone (330,000) and “offers 
the second largest asset management in the world with $1,693 billion in assets” (Lavery et al., 
2017; Quennouëlle-Core, 2018: 73; Paris Europlace 2018). Furthermore, both Frankfurt and 
Paris are embedded within the EU’s two most powerful member states. Each city also plays host 
to key EU regulatory and supervisory authorities – such as the ECB and the European Insurance 
and Occupational Authority (EIOPA) in Frankfurt and the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) and European Banking Authority (EBA) in Paris.  
 
The data on which this article draws comes predominantly from 29 semi-structured elite 
interviews conducted with stakeholders in both Frankfurt (November 2017) and Paris (February 
and March 2018). We ‘mapped’, contacted and interviewed a diverse set of political and 
economic actors in both cases in order to facilitate a disaggregated understanding of the various 
actors’ interests and attitudes within each financial centre. Across both cases, we spoke with 
actors at five global and regional banks, four financial marketing/lobbying organisations, two 
national regulatory authorities, three financial market infrastructure providers, three trade 
associations, three national and local level government agencies and an EU agency. This 
interview data is supported by documentary analysis of over 300 French and German language 
strategy documents, marketing statements, policy reports, public statements and interviews from 
political and economic actors in both Paris and Frankfurt, which were translated, coded and 
analysed during an earlier phase of this research project.  
 
Frankfurt and Paris as financial centres after Brexit 
In the following subsections, we answer the core research puzzle of this article: how have actors 
within European financial centres responded to Brexit?  Outlining our key findings from 
Frankfurt and Paris, the analysis emphasises the importance of conceptualising the emerging 
competition between European financial centres in terms of diversity, path dependency, 
territory and regulatory stability. These four observations are related insofar as together they 
underline the importance of analysing empirically financial centres as distinctive sub-national 
sites of economic organisation and political power. Each empirical observation in turn has 
broader theoretical implications for the European studies literature, as outlined in the 
penultimate section of this article.    
  
1. The financial centres of Frankfurt and Paris centres contain 
numerous actors with divergent strategic orientations  
 
Financial centres are not homogenous entities. They contain numerous actors with often 
divergent interests and strategic priorities. In broad terms, the first distinction that can be drawn 
is between ‘political’ and ‘economic’ actors. This is an important distinction, because as a 
representative of a global bank in Frankfurt noted with regards to the opportunities created by 
Brexit for alternative financial centres: 
  
‘It depends on who you ask. If you are asking local policymakers in some of the cities 
that now may benefit from an influx of investment bankers and so on, they will probably 
say that Brexit is a good deal for us. For the financial industry, it is definitely a ‘lose-
lose’ situation. There is no gain in an increase in fragmentation. There will be 
additional costs.’ (Global bank A official in Frankfurt, 07/11/2017) 
  
As this quote suggests, political actors are embedded within a particular territorial context and 
respond to a distinct set of incentives. Their main concern is to boost business activities, 
employment and tax revenues in their respective territories. As a result, they tend to adopt a 
proactive role in promoting their respective financial centres after Brexit. ‘Economic’ actors, on 
the other hand, act according to a different incentive structure. Broadly speaking - and allowing 
for differences in their approach to the territory, as discussed below - economic actors tend to be 
less concerned with boosting a specific financial location. For them, the primary concern is to 
contain instability and minimise transaction costs. Actors within Frankfurt and Paris therefore 
display contending strategic priorities in relation to key post-Brexit issues, for example in 
relation to euro-denominated clearing, as we discuss subsequently. This implies that it is 
necessary to disaggregate and ‘map’ the different actors that operate within Frankfurt and Paris 
as financial centres.  
 
In the case of Frankfurt, the state of Hesse and the Frankfurt city government have played a key 
role in promoting the German city as a financial centre. These bodies have been directly 
involved in coordinating promotional activities and have contributed funds towards a variety of 
lobbying groups and marketing agencies with the express goal of furthering Frankfurt as a 
financial centre, including the Frankfurt Main Finance and Frankfurt Rhein Main lobbying 
groups. A number of initiatives have been coordinated by this political network, such as 
roadshows, media outreach campaigns, international meetings as well as lobbying efforts. 
 
In the case of Paris, political actors at the national level, including both the Socialist 
administration under President Hollande and Emmanuel Macron’s new centrist administration, 
have assumed a more prominent role in promoting Paris as a financial centre after Brexit. These 
national-level interventions are flanked by complementary regional initiatives. The council of 
the Île-de-France region has been active in both a PR campaign to improve the image of Paris as 
a city open to finance and business and the facilitation of initiatives such as ‘Choose Paris 
Region’, a ‘one-stop shop for simplifying procedures for foreign investors’. The efforts of both 
national and local actors have been complemented by Paris EUROPLACE, a financial lobby 
organisation with strong personal links to both the private sector firms and government, 
including a ‘very good relationship’ with the French Treasury (French Treasury official (A), 
27/02/2018). 
 
Frankfurt and Paris also play host to a broad range of market actors with distinct business 
models and investment strategies. Four broad types of financial institutions within both financial 
centres can be identified. The first is made up of transnational financial institutions - and in 
particular global banks - that have a presence in Frankfurt and Paris. Examples of these include 
Deutsche Bank in the case of Frankfurt and HSBC and Société Générale in Paris. The second 
type includes market infrastructure providers - in particular stock exchanges and associated 
clearing houses - such as Deutsche Börse and Euronext Paris. The third type is made up of 
regionally-oriented financial institutions, such as the Landesbank Helaba. Lastly, there are trade 
associations which represent sub-sectors from within finance - for example large banks or asset 
management companies - who seek to engage with both regulators and state officials. 
 
2. Path dependencies and comparative differences shape the 
emerging competition between Frankfurt and Paris 
 
Within the public debate as well as in the academic literature, the ‘race’ between European 
financial centres is often conceptualised as having begun in June 2016, in the aftermath of the 
‘Brexit’ vote (see Shotter et al. 2017; Howarth and Quaglia 2018). Furthermore, this ‘battle’ is 
often implicitly assumed to involve units - the various financial centres - which are comparable 
in terms of their functional capacities and political composition. But the ‘battle’ over European 
finance takes place upon an uneven institutional terrain and involves financial centres with 
distinct characteristics. Path dependencies play an important role in shaping the emerging 
competition between European financial centres after Brexit. 
 
Financial centres have long pre-histories which shapes their contemporary structure in important 
ways (Cassis, 2006). Some European financial centres have specialisations in specific sub-
sectors such as investment banking or asset management. Global banks also have pre-existing 
linkages with European financial centres, for example through having branches or back office 
functions in different locations. Furthermore, relations between financial centres and political 
structures differ markedly across different states. Collectively, these varying institutional 
arrangements condition the terrain on which the emerging ‘battle’ between European financial 
centres is taking place.  
 
Our empirical material from Frankfurt and Paris underscores the key importance which path 
dependencies play in shaping emerging patterns of competition between these centres. As one 
representative of a global bank in Frankfurt noted, ‘traditional linkages of individual institutions 
to different markets are key. HSBC has a long standing and large presence in France whilst 
German and many Swiss banks have Frankfurt as their traditional hub. Many US investment 
banks have a link towards Dublin’ (Global bank A official in Frankfurt, 07/11/2017). In addition 
to this, each financial centre has a certain number of functional specialisations which determine 
the particular sub-sectors which they are targeting for relocation. As another respondent from a 
global institution based in Frankfurt noted, ‘we see specialisations emerging, where currently 
Luxembourg and Dublin are qualifying for “specialised” industries, Amsterdam more for the 
technology side, and now it’s a question of where the classical banking business goes: Paris or 
Frankfurt?’ (German Market Infrastructure provider, 09/11/2017).  
 
The promotional strategies adopted by Paris and Frankfurt in the aftermath of the Brexit vote 
also reflect the constitutional context and political systems of which they are part. The French 
state is organised around a powerful centralised executive. A discernible sovereigntist logic has 
therefore underpinned efforts of the central government and the office of the President to boost 
Paris after Brexit, with a number of stakeholders commenting that this effort was being driven 
from the very top of the French government. Shortly after the Brexit vote, then Prime Minister 
Manuel Valls declared that he wanted to see Paris become ‘Europe’s premiere financial centre’ 
and joined lobby organisation Paris EUROPLACE at conferences designed to promote Paris. 
The government introduced tax and regulatory reforms including lowering corporation tax and 
extending a tax break for those coming to work in France. As several interviewees confirmed, 
the election of Emmanuel Macron as President in May 2017 has only served to accelerate the 
initiatives begun under the Socialist administration (French financial lobbyist, 26/02/2018; 
French Treasury official (B), 27/02/2018). 
 
This is in stark contrast to Frankfurt, where the leading role in promoting the financial location 
has been taken by the Hesse state government and the city-region. With the exception of the 
application for the location of the EBA, there has been very minimal involvement by the Federal 
government in Berlin in the promotion of Frankfurt as a financial centre (FMF representative, 
10/11/2017). As one Frankfurt stakeholder commented, promoters for the city ‘would have 
appreciated more involvement [from the Federal government] in this process’ but quickly found 
that ‘the view from Berlin is that “Frankfurt is a case for the state of Hesse, not the Federal 
state”’ (Hesse region trade association official, 08/11/2017). In sum, Frankfurt and Paris have 
distinct characteristics as financial centres - in terms of their existing relations with global 
banks, their sectoral specialisations and their varying constitutional systems - which shape the 
emerging competition between them after Brexit.  
 
3. Territorial factors shape the emerging competition between 
Frankfurt and Paris  
 
A third key observation is that the territorial dimensions of financial centres matter. By 
‘territorial dimensions’ we mean the specific institutions and frameworks which are ‘embedded’ 
within both Frankfurt and Paris and which give rise, in turn, to a broader financial ecosystem 
within each territory. First, territorial considerations play an important role in the business 
models of various private financial institutions. This is particularly clear in the case of 
Frankfurt, which plays host to prominent regional and cooperative banks which are deeply 
integrated into the regional economy of Hesse. The Landesbank Helaba, for instance, is a 
regional financial institution whose business model consists in lending to local businesses and 
households. As a result, its interests are closely tied with those of the region it is located in 
(Regional bank official in Frankfurt, 08/11/2017). This is manifest in the very prominent role 
that the bank has played in promoting Frankfurt as a financial location and in participating in the 
various local marketing initiatives (FMF, 2017: 41). For regional banks such as Helaba, Brexit 
appears primarily as an opportunity, because the risks of financial instability are offset by the 
business advantages of increased market activity, jobs and housing prices. 
 
Second, the location of EU regulators and agencies within financial centres shapes the emerging 
competition between Frankfurt and Paris in important ways. For example, Frankfurt plays host 
to the ECB and EIOPA, respectively one of the key centres of Eurozone financial supervision 
and the agency responsible for supervising pension products in the EU. Similarly, Paris plays 
host to ESMA, which has responsibility for ensuring supervisory convergence in relation to 
European capital markets and looks set to secure further powers as a result of the Commission’s 
‘European Supervisory Authorities’ review. Furthermore, the EBA moved to Paris in November 
2017 as a result of its relocation from London after Brexit.  
 
The location of these EU agencies in Frankfurt and Paris is important in shaping the emerging 
competition between these financial centres. EU regulators insist, of course, that the location of 
regulatory agencies within a particular financial centre is not designed to - and should not in 
practice - benefit the host centre. But there are important unintended consequences of these 
locational decisions which can spill over into a comparative advantage for the ‘host’ centres. 
Enjoying ‘proximity’ to regulators is a key consideration for financial market actors. As one 
representative of a global bank in Frankfurt put it to us, ‘when you have an organisation like the 
ECB based here, proximity does play a  role […] It attracts critical mass, it has a knock on 
effect’ (Global bank B in Frankfurt official, 10/11/2017). The location of important EU agencies 
in Frankfurt and Paris helps to underpin a broader ‘eco-system’ of financial interests which 
together can prove attractive to firms seeking to relocate after Brexit.  
 The advantages of ‘hosting’ large EU financial authorities forms a core element in the post-
Brexit strategy of both Frankfurt and Paris. As a representative of a leading regional marketing 
agency in Frankfurt put it to us, ‘[our] key advantage is that it is a financial centre that… 
already provides the whole 'ecosystem' that is required by banks’ (FRM Senior representative, 
09/11/2017). Similarly, political actors in Paris are seeking to take advantage of the recent 
decision to move the EBA to the French capital. One Treasury official noted the key ‘symbolic 
value’ of the decision, as it demonstrates the ability of the French authorities to facilitate the 
transfer of banking functions to their territory (French Treasury official (A), 27/02/2018). 
 
4.  ‘Regulatory Stability’ is an important asset for competing 
financial centres  
 
Brexit introduces new forms of uncertainty into the European financial market. Numerous 
respondents from private financial firms underlined the importance of securing stability in the 
post-Brexit environment. As the representative of a large US bank in Frankfurt told us, ‘When 
you’re going through a process of political instability – which is what Brexit injects into the 
equation – there’s a natural tendency to not look for the next “cool deal”. You’re looking for 
stability and clarity – a paradigm with which I can work and understand and feel comfortable’ 
(Global bank B in Frankfurt official, 10/11/2017). Similarly, in Paris, financial operators 
emphasised the key importance of securing regulatory stability and avoiding regulatory 
fragmentation after Brexit (French trade association official, 28/02/2018; Global bank B official 
in Paris, 02/03/2018; French Market Infrastructure provider, 27/02/2018). The ability of 
financial centres to provide a ‘stable’ regulatory environment has therefore become a key factor 
in the emerging competition between Frankfurt and Paris. This concern with regulatory stability 
shapes the race between European financial centres in two related ways. 
 First, political actors within Frankfurt and Paris are responding to this desire for ‘stability’ in 
their promotional strategies. One Frankfurt lobbyist stated, ‘Germany is an anchor of stability in 
a world that is becoming very “interesting” in political and economic terms. Within Germany - 
in that anchor of stability - you have Frankfurt as a financial centre’ (FRM Senior 
representative, 09/11/2017). A representative from a global bank in Paris similarly argued that 
France’s reputation for ‘strong but stable’ regulation ‘is probably something that can attract 
financial players’ to Paris, particularly larger institutions (Global bank B official in Paris, 
02/03/2018). 
 
The second axis through which the question of ‘regulatory stability’ is shaping the competition 
between European financial centres is in relation to the question of regulatory arbitrage. After 
Brexit, banks and other financial institutions will have to relocate sections of their businesses to 
remaining EU member states. This creates the prospect of ‘regulatory arbitrage’, a situation 
where national regulators, in concert with politicians, loosely apply EU supervisory standards in 
order to induce investment. Certain smaller financial centres - most notably Luxembourg and 
Dublin - are regularly identified as centres which may engage in strategies of this nature. As one 
national regulator in Paris commented, ‘our worry is how small and medium-sized countries 
could have lower requirements’ and thus engage in a regulatory ‘race to the bottom’ to attract 
businesses away from more established centres of Frankfurt and Paris. Similarly, a 
representative of a Frankfurt based banking association commented: 
 
 ‘At the beginning [after Brexit], there was a competition between the different financial 
centres but also some regulators…When I spoke to my members, they visited Dublin, 
Madrid, Paris, Amsterdam, Frankfurt and they said it was quite different what the 
various authorities told them…. The big fear was that there would be regulatory 
arbitrage between the different financial centres.’ (Official from a foreign bank 
association in Germany, 06/11/2017) 
 
In response, numerous interviewees - in particular from Paris - cited the importance of 
strengthening the power of EU supervisors such as ESMA. One French Treasury official told us 
that ‘we  want  to  create  level  playing  field...our  worry  is  how  small  and  medium-sized  
countries  could  have  lower  requirements’ (French Treasury official (A), 27/02/2018). Far 
from producing a regulatory ‘race to the bottom’, our research suggests that powerful actors 
within alternative European financial centres are utilising Brexit to toughen up regulatory 
standards through advocating a further transfer of supervisory powers to the EU level.  
 
Implications for future research in EU studies  
Our empirical analysis of Frankfurt and Paris after Brexit has important theoretical implications 
for the EU studies literature more broadly. First, adopting a ‘financial centres’ perspective, 
drawing on a well-established literature within economic geography, can improve our 
understanding of the emerging ‘battle’ over financial services in Europe. Second, our analysis 
has important implications for a growing body of literature on European disintegration.  
 
European financial centres 
 
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods order, the financial sector has expanded rapidly 
across the global economy (Panitch and Gindin, 2014). The rise of global finance led to a rapid 
expansion of international financial centres. New York, London and Tokyo emerged as key 
centres in the new global economy, while ‘second tier’ centres - such as Frankfurt, Paris and 
Dublin - also expanded on the back of a rising tide of financial globalisation. However, the EU 
studies literature has not interrogated the rise of international financial centres or the 
implications which this has for European integration (Howarth and Quaglia, 2018). This limits 
the ability of the EU studies literature, in its current form, to analyse the emerging competition 
between European financial centres after Brexit.  
 
In order to overcome this blindspot, the EU studies literature would benefit from drawing on 
literatures from outside the ‘integration theory’ canon. In particular, there is a well-established 
literature within economic geography which has theorised the rise of global financial centres 
(see Taylor, 2001; Sassen, 2011; Wojick, 2013; Hall 2018). John Friedmann and Saskia Sassen 
originated this research programme, highlighting how global cities at the ‘core’ of the world 
economy benefited from and in turn shaped financial globalisation (Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 
2011).  This approach was further developed by the so-called ‘Globalisation and World Cities’ 
(GaWC) research network, associated with Peter Taylor and his collaborators, which traced the 
ways in which new patterns of connectivity between international financial centres was 
conditioning the global economy (Taylor, 2001). The core insight of this approach is that 
financial centres are peculiar spaces within the contemporary geography of global capitalism. 
On the one hand, they display a highly internationalised character, insofar as they play host to 
transnational corporations highly integrated into global capital flows. On the other hand, 
financial centres are always embedded within particular national regulatory systems and local 
institutional contexts (Hall, 2017). Financial centres are therefore inherently hybrid 
constellations where global, national and local dynamics interact. Our empirical analysis of 
Frankfurt and Paris demonstrates how a ‘financial centres’ perspective, drawing upon this 
economic geography literature, can illuminate new dimensions of the ‘battle’ for financial 
services after Brexit.  
 
First, the strategic orientations of actors within financial centres cannot simply be reduced to a 
‘battle’ between inherently ‘transnational’ economic and ‘national’ political interests. In the 
case of Frankfurt, for example, the Landesbank Helaba has a distinctive business model which 
is deeply integrated into the regional economy of Hesse. As a result, Helaba has adopted a 
proactive approach in boosting Frankfurt as a financial centre. In contrast, a representative of an 
association representing foreign banks in Frankfurt stated, in relation to the future of the euro-
clearing business, that ‘the industry side is not really interested in moving euro-clearing [from 
the City of London] to another place. We want to avoid fragmentation. From the viewpoint of 
cost efficiency, it is preferable that all the infrastructure and liquidity is in one place’ (Official 
from a banking association in Germany, 06/11/2017). Both of these organisations are 
‘economic’ in character, yet each has distinct interests in relation to the dynamics unleashed by 
Brexit. In order to account for these differences, it is necessary to remain attentive to the ways 
in which their business models are integrated into and shaped by their geographical context.  
 
Second, a ‘financial centres’ perspective illuminates the ways in which the location of EU 
agencies and national regulators shapes competition between rival European financial centres. 
The location of European agencies such as the ECB in Frankfurt or the EBA in Paris enhances 
the attractiveness of these financial centres, insofar as this helps to deepen the ‘ecosystem’ of 
each financial centre and affords actors within them close proximity to regulatory bodies. 
Political actors within both financial centres have sought to ‘boost’ their respective territories by 
consistently highlighting this point.  Furthermore, a financial centre perspective can help to 
make sense of the seemingly paradoxical behaviour displayed by NCAs since Brexit. NCAs - 
specifically the Bundesbank in the case of Frankfurt and the AMF in the case of Paris - have 
proactively taken part in ‘roadshows’ and other promotional activities on behalf of their host 
financial centres. The official rationale for this activity is that the regulators want to ensure that 
prospective investors are aware of the processes involved in applying for banking licences and 
other legal issues involved in relocation after Brexit. However, alternative logics are also at play 
(French trade association official, 28/02/2018). In the French case, the resources at the disposal 
of the NCAs are partly determined by the level of activity taking place within their jurisdiction. 
There is therefore a clear institutional logic which can lead NCAs towards ‘boosting’ the size of 
business activity within their host financial centre. The territorial ‘embeddedness’ of both EU 
agencies and national regulators therefore plays a key role in shaping the emerging competition 
between European financial centres after Brexit.  
 
European disintegration theory   
 
A recent body of literature has attempted to chart emerging patterns of disintegration within the 
EU (Zielonka, 2014; Webber, 2013; Rosamond, 2016; Jones, 2018). This literature seeks to 
account for how contemporary challenges to European integration, such as rising 
Euroscepticism, the Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis and Brexit, might be theorised and 
examined empirically (Bulmer and Joseph, 2016; Hooghe and Marks, 2009). The disintegration 
literature begins from the premise that conventional approaches in EU studies lack an 
appropriate toolkit to interrogate emergent disintegrative pressures (Webber, 2014; Jones, 
2018). As Rosamond has argued, both supra-nationalist and inter-governmentalist approaches 
assume that integration takes place against a series of ‘prior background conditions’, including 
growing ‘economic interdependence’ and ‘transnational exchange’ (Rosamond, 2016; see 
Moravscik, 1993; Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997). However, since the global financial crisis, this 
assumption looks increasingly untenable. The Eurozone crisis, for example, precipitated a rapid 
fragmentation of European financial markets, as capital fled the Southern European periphery 
into safer assets in Germany (Offe, 2014). Brexit, similarly, embodies a moment of regulatory 
decoupling which is likely to increase barriers to trade between the UK and the EU27. 
Disintegration theorists seek to integrate these disintegrative tendencies into a wider theoretical 
framework (Webber, 2013; Vollard, 2014; Jones, 2018).  
 
There is not sufficient space to fully engage with the growing ‘disintegration’ literature here. 
However, we can identify two ways in which our analysis builds-upon this emerging theoretical 
corpus. First, it is important to note that ‘disintegration’ is not one homogenous process (Jones, 
2018: 450). Distinct disintegrative dynamics exist within the social, political and economic 
spheres (Eppler et al. 2016). In relation to Brexit, it is important to distinguish between the 
economic fragmentation which is likely to follow the UK’s exit from the EU and the 
institutional response to this dynamic from within the EU institutions. This distinction is 
particularly important in the sphere of finance. Once the UK becomes a ‘third country’, new 
barriers to trade between the City and the EU will emerge. In turn, this is likely to generate a 
geographical fragmentation of business activities across the EU, as firms relocate personnel and 
functions to different European financial centres within the Single Market.  
 
This dynamic is likely to generate increased transaction costs for financial institutions operating 
within the Single Market. But this process of financial market fragmentation is not synonymous 
with European disintegration. The emerging competition between European financial centres 
after Brexit increases the threat of regulatory arbitrage, where national supervisors and 
politicians laxly apply supervisory standards in order to induce investment. For instance, the 
Irish financial services minister complained in 2017 to the Commission over what he considered 
to be Luxembourg’s attempt to engage in ‘regulatory arbitrage’ in its attempt to secure 
investment from the insurer AIG (Boland et al., 2017). As we have seen, the threat of arbitrage 
was regularly alluded to by our interviewees in Frankfurt and Paris.  
 
One official from the French Treasury suggested that ‘an obvious way to avoid this would be to 
provide direct supervisory powers’ to European agencies in order to maintain ‘a level playing 
field’ (French Treasury official (A), 27/02/2018). This comment relates to the recent proposal 
from the European Commission to enhance the power, resources and mandate of the ‘European 
Supervisory Authorities’ (ESAs). These include the ESMA, EIOPA and the EBA. The 
comments from this French Treasury official reflect a broader approach which was evident 
across our interviews, which was the acknowledgement that enhanced European supervisory 
powers would help to constrain ‘unfair competition’ between rival financial centres after Brexit. 
A French financial regulator, for instance, suggested that the regulator was ‘very much in favour 
of a stronger ESMA’ in light of the UK’s exit from the EU (French financial regulator, 
26/02/2018). One representative of the German banking industry also noted the key role which 
the ECB, EBA and ESMA would play in preventing the establishment of ‘letter box’ entities 
within member states (Official from a foreign bank association in Germany, 06/11/2017). 
 
The financial fragmentation associated with Brexit does not therefore deliver a straightforward 
regulatory ‘race to the bottom’ or indeed a ‘disintegration’ of the EU’s supervisory 
architecture.iii Rather, as actors respond to Brexit’s fragmentary dynamics and seek to both 
contain financial instability and protect their relative comparative advantage in financial 
services, important pressures towards further integration at the European level are being 
generated. Our analysis of Frankfurt and Paris therefore advances a concrete case study of how 
fragmentary dynamics and integrative pressures can interact, complementing disintegration 
theory’s expectation that novel patterns of European development will emerge in the future 
(Zielonka, 2014: 106; Rosamond, 2016: 868; Jones, 2018: 450).  
 
A second implication our analysis has for disintegration theory relates to the importance of sub-
national agency in shaping disintegrative dynamics. Disintegration theorists have pointed to 
numerous drivers of disintegration, including shifting patterns of international power (Webber, 
2014), deficiencies in the structuring of the EU as a political community (Vollaard 2014), and 
the fracturing of the ‘democratic capitalist compact’ in Europe (Rosamond, 2016). These 
approaches all point to how macro-level reconfigurations contribute to disintegrative tendencies 
in the EU. Our focus on financial centres adds a further dimension to these analyses, insofar as 
it highlights how sub-national actors shape disintegrative pressures in Europe. ‘Rival’ European 
financial centres to the City of London, taken broadly, are set to benefit from financial market 
fragmentation. Across our interviews, numerous respondents acknowledged the key opportunity 
which Brexit presented to them. One interviewee from Frankfurt stated that, ‘[After Brexit] a 
tagline for us was: “never waste a good crisis”. Brexit is bad for Europe, bad for the UK, bad for 
Germany, but it’s a once in a century chance for Frankfurt’ (FMF representative, 10/11/2017). 
As we have seen, political actors and marketing agencies within both Frankfurt and Paris have 
mobilised, often with the tacit support of their respective NCAs, in order to ‘capitalise’ on the 
Brexit process. In each case, the distinctive legal, political and regulatory architecture of each 
financial centre is utilised to boost post-Brexit investment.  
Conclusion 
Brexit involves a ‘regulatory decoupling’ of the UK from the EU. This has potentially far-
reaching consequences in the sphere of EU finance. Brexit is likely to generate a fragmentation 
in EU financial integration which in turn imposes clear costs on member states. But it also 
creates the opportunity for alternative European financial centres to ‘capitalise’ on Brexit. 
Tracing the emerging competition between European financial centres should therefore form a 
key area of future enquiry. However, as we have argued, EU studies is ill-equipped at present to 
interrogate this emerging process. Conceptually, conventional approaches to EU finance tend to 
privilege either the supra-national or inter-governmental scales of analysis. This renders the sub-
national scale of financial centres relatively invisible in the literature. In this article, we have 
sought to fill this lacuna by advancing an empirical and comparative account of Frankfurt and 
Paris as two leading financial centres in the aftermath of the Brexit vote.  
 
Our analysis opens up new avenues for research in EU studies. Empirically, we have argued that 
the issues of diversity, path dependency, territory and regulatory stability shapes the emerging 
competition between Frankfurt and Paris in important ways. European financial centres contain 
numerous actors with distinct strategies and preferences. Future research should trace the 
evolution of the strategies of these actors as the Brexit process unfolds. More broadly, future 
analysis should interrogate the ways in which the tension-ridden politics of financial centres 
feeds into national models of capitalism and may have an impact on non-financial firms who are 
reliant upon capital market funding from the City and other European financial centres. 
Financial fragmentation after Brexit also threatens to diminish the global competitiveness of 
European financial markets. In this situation, the true ‘winners’ from the UK's exit may lie 
outside the EU, as financial activity is re-located to the US and to emerging East Asian 
markets.    
 
Since the Eurozone crisis, new theories of disintegration have emerged alongside more 
conventional integration theories. Our empirical material suggests that disintegrative tendencies 
and functionalist integrative pressures are not mutually exclusive. They coexist and combine in 
important ways. Brexit both threatens financial market fragmentation and acts as a driver of 
new integrative dynamics, for example in relation to supervisory convergence at the EU level. 
Again, our sub-national perspective on financial centres underlines the point that these divergent 
pressures do not operate ‘behind the backs’ of financial centre actors. They must be interpreted 
and acted upon, both by ‘political’ and ‘economic’ actors. This in turn opens up future pathways 
of research in relation to financial centres. Specifically, it suggests that future research should 
trace how the divergent interests of actors within European financial centres are managed 
politically and how, in turn, this process shapes national models of capitalism, European finance 
and the European integration process more broadly.  
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 Notes 
(1) At the time of writing (September 2018), Theresa May was attempting to secure her 
government’s ‘Chequers Deal’ at the EU level. This would involve alignment on goods but 
not on services. This proposal was poorly received by the EU authorities and faced 
trenchant parliamentary opposition in the British parliament. If a variant of Chequers fails, 
the prospect of a ‘No Deal’ scenario is one possible outcome. Alternatively, a general 
election or even a second referendum may be held to resolve the deadlock.   
 
(2) Other European financial centres of course may benefit from Brexit as well. Dublin, 
Luxembourg, Milan, Amsterdam and Zurich are regularly cited as possible candidates. We 
focus on Frankfurt and Paris due to the combination of the size of their financial centres and 
their political significance (Cassis, 2018: 14). Future comparative research should 
interrogate the relation between Brexit and other smaller European financial centres.  
 
(3) There is no guarantee, of course, that Brexit will inevitably lead to supervisory convergence 
in the sphere of finance. Although the Commission has pushed for greater powers for the 
ESAs, some domestic actors – notably some NCAs and sub-sections of finance – are likely 
to oppose further convergence at the EU level. Future research should trace the emerging 
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